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Bryan Mudd: Montana's Response to Kelo

WAS THE BIG SKY REALLY FALLING?
EXAMINING MONTANA'S RESPONSE TO
KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON
Michelle Bryan Mudd*

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Supreme Court sent shockwaves throughout the
country when it ruled in Kelo v. City of New London' that New
London, Connecticut could condemn ordinary neighborhood
properties and resell the land to private developers for economic
development. 2 Those shockwaves were felt in Montana, where
many citizens let it be known that they did not want Kelo to happen in their state. But could Kelo happen in Montana? The short
answer is "no"-not under facts like those in the Kelo case. But
the introspection Kelo triggered did reveal some gray areas in the
State's eminent domain law that warranted clarification. Ultimately, however, the Legislature lost sight of Montana law in its
rush to enact a Kelo fix and may have taken the response too far
by eliminating an important tool for condemning and renewing
unsafe urban properties.
Part I of this article summarizes the Kelo decision and highlights what will later be shown as key distinctions between U.S.
Supreme Court jurisprudence and eminent domain law in Montana. Part II provides a brief sketch of Montana eminent domain
law, highlights the key distinctions between Montana law and
Kelo, and identifies some of the gray areas in Montana law. Part
III then describes Montana's legislative response to Kelo and
where the State's eminent domain law stands today. Finally, the
article concludes with an assessment of Montana's response to
Kelo and suggests future possibilities for Montana's eminent domain law that better balance private property rights and community safety.
* Michelle Bryan Mudd teaches land use law at The University of Montana School of Law and
directs its Land Use Clinic. Before joining the law faculty she enjoyed a private practice in real estate
and land use law in Montana. A special thanks to Amelia Anne for patiently awaiting our tea party
while I finished this article; to Stacey Gordon for her valuable research assistance and editorial suggestions; and to Robert G. Natelson for his editorial suggestions and his insights on the interplay between
standards of review and rules of construction.
1. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
2. Id. at 488-90.
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SUMMARY OF THE KELO DECISION

A.

The Human Stories

The public's interest in Kelo lies in the human stories of the
case. The landowners New London threatened with condemnation included middle-class Americans living in ordinary, maintained homes in a typical residential neighborhood. Among them
was Wilhelmina Dery, born to Italian immigrants in 1918 in the
very house New London condemned, and who had lived there for
sixty years with her husband Charles. 3 Their son Matthew Dery
lived next door in a home his grandmother gave him as a wedding
gift.4 Their neighbor Susette Kelo was a registered nurse who had
purchased her Victorian-era home for its view and access to the
5
water, and invested her money and time restoring her home.
None of the properties involved were blighted or in poor condition. 6 In the words of the Institute for Justice, which took the
landowners' case, the "richness and vibrancy of this neighborhood
reflect[ed] the American ideal of community and the dream of
home ownership," and was destroyed for other private enterprises
7
based on a "nebulous" concept of economic development.
New London, on the other hand, told the tale of a failing community in an "untenable economic situation."8 Its naval facility at
Fort Trumball closed in 1996, its unemployment rate was "nearly
double that of the State," and its population had declined to depression-era levels. 9 When pharmaceutical giant Pfizer Inc. proposed to build a $300 million research facility next to Fort
Trumball, city planners leaped at the opportunity to rejuvenate
New London by drawing new business to Fort Trumball. 10 New
London created a ninety-acre redevelopment plan that included a
conference center, restaurants, shopping, a pedestrian riverwalk,
new residences, a museum, and office and retail space.' 1 Planners
3. Id. at 475; Petr.'s Br. at 1-2, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
4. Petr.'s Br. at 2, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
5. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475; Petr.'s Br. at 2, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469
(2005).
6. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475.
7. Institute for Justice, Cases, Private Property Rights, Eminent Domain Abuse in
New London, Connecticut, http://www.ij.org/private-property/connecticut/ (accessed Feb.
26, 2008).
8. Respt.'s Br. at 1, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
9. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 474.
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projected that the redevelopment would create 1,000 new jobs and
increase tax and other revenue. 12 All that stood in New London's
way were 115 private lots within the development area. Ultimately nine landowners, including Ms. Kelo and the Dery Family,
refused to sell when they discovered that their land would likely
go to private developers rather than for use by the general public.13
This classic David-meets-Goliath story made for easy reporting, and Americans, including thousands of everyday Montanans,
predictably formed a belief that local government could now give
their middle-class homes to a big private developer. 14 Less easy to
report were the legal nuances of the United States Supreme
Court's decision that New London could indeed take the landowners' properties under federal constitutional law and Connecticut's
broad definition of "public use."1 5 Had those legal nuances been
better understood, the response in states like Montana, with more
restrictive constitutional and eminent domain principles, may
have been more measured.
B.

Connecticut's Eminent Domain Law

Connecticut, like many other states, 16 has a statute that expressly recognizes economic development as a type of "public use"
for which land can be condemned.1 7 Indeed, its General Assembly
has declared a state policy that acquiring and improving "unified
land and water areas" for the "growth of industry and business"particularly in "distressed municipalities"' 8-is integral to the
12. Id. at 472.
13. Id. at 475-76, 479.
14. Infra pt. III.A.
15. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488-90.
16. See Castle Coalition, 50 State Report Card: Tracking Eminent Domain Reform Legislation Since Kelo (June 2007), http://www.castlecoalition.org/publications/reportcard/
index.html (summarizing each state's eminent domain statutes from a property rights perspective) [hereinafter 50 State Report Card].
17. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 8-186, -193, 48-6 (2005).
18. Id. at § 32-9p(b) (defining "Distressed municipality" as "any municipality in the
state which, according to the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development meets the necessary number of quantitative physical and economic distress thresholds which are then applicable for eligibility for the urban development action grant program under the Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, as amended [42
U.S.C.A. § 5318], or any town within which is located an unconsolidated city or borough
which meets such distress thresholds"). Title 42 U.S.C.A. § 5318 in turn takes into account
"factors such as the age of housing; the extent of poverty; the extent of population lag;
growth of per capita income; and the extent of unemployment, job lag, or surplus labor."

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2008

3

Montana Law Review, Vol. 69 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 2

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 69

state's economic welfare and thus in the public interest.19 Notably, condemnation for economic development does not require a
showing of blight or other poor conditions on the affected parcels. 20 In fact, the principal focus of the condemnation is not on
the condition of the existing land use (whatever that may be) but
rather on the potential for the "upgraded" land use to bring more
21
revenue to the distressed community.
Connecticut had designated New London as a distressed municipality in 1990, even before the naval facility closure caused another 1,500 people to lose their jobs. 2 2 Fort Trumball was also
considered a "regional center" for which the Connecticut Legislature set a goal of "encouraging new industries to locate.., to provide meaningful economic opportunity for inner city residents
.... 23 These designations helped New London undertake economic development (and receive federal subsidies) through a formal revitalization plan that received state agency approval. 2 4 It
was under this state-specific set of economic development laws
that the Kelo case arose.
C.

The U.S. Supreme Court's Ruling

The sole question before the United States Supreme Court in
Kelo was whether New London's condemnation for economic development qualified as a "public use" for which property could be
taken under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution (made applicable to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment).2 5 The Court, with Justice Stevens writing for the majority,
held that economic development was indeed a public use. 26
Under what it termed a "strong theme of federalism" jurisprudence, the Court noted that the New London condemnation was
based on a Connecticut statute that specifically recognizes economic development as a public use.2 7 The Court then extended its
"longstanding policy of deference" to New London's assessment
19. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 8-186.
20. Id. at §§ 8-186, -189.
21. This focus contrasts with the principal focus of blight statutes, which is supposed to
be on rehabilitating existing properties when possible and eliminating and preventing the
recurrence of blight where rehabilitation cannot occur. See infra pt. II.B.
22. Kelo v.City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 473 (2005).
23. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-66b.
24. Id. at § 8-189.
25. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 472.
26. Id. at 484.
27. Id. at 480, 482-84.
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that "the area was sufficiently distressed to justify a program of
economic rejuvenation ... ,"28 Observing that New London had a
"carefully formulated" plan that had undergone "thorough deliberation" and state agency review, the Court declined to question the
City's judgment that the condemnations would likely result in "appreciable benefits to the community."2 9 The Court distinguished
New London's comprehensive planned area from a one-to-one
transfer of an individual parcel of land to a pre-selected private
party "outside the confines of an integrated development plan"-a
30
transaction that likely would receive greater judicial scrutiny.
The Court upheld the condemnation even though much of the
condemned property would end up in private ownership with no
guarantee of general public use. According to the Court, it "long
ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned property be
put into use for the general public" in favor of a more expansive
reading of public use as "public purpose." 3 1 The Court observed
that economic development is a traditional government function
that benefits the public, even if individual private parties benefit
as well: "The public end may be as well or better served through
an agency of private enterprise than through a department of gov-

ernment .

32
...

Additionally, the Court did not scrutinize the

wisdom of including particular homes such as those of the Dery
Family or Ms. Kelo within the redevelopment area. Rather, the
Court extended deference to the whole of New London's plan and
declined to review properties "on a piecemeal basis," stating that
"U]ust as we decline to second-guess the City's considered judgments about the efficacy of its development plan, we also decline
what lands it
to second-guess the City's determinations as to '33
project.
the
effectuate
to
order
needs to acquire in
The Court did not inquire into whether the economic development plan ultimately would be successful, observing that once a
condemnation meets the public purpose standard, any "empirical
28. Id. at 480, 483 ("For more than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely
eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power.").
29. Id. at 473-74, 483-84.
30. Id. at 487.
31. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479 (citing Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984)
(upholding the government's condemnation and sale of privately-held lands to lessees to
remedy land oligopoly in the State of Hawaii)).
32. Id. at 483-86 (citing Berman v. Parker,348 U.S. 26, 34 (1954) (upholding condemnation and sale of blighted lands to new landowners to eliminate and prevent reversion of
slum areas in Washington, D.C.)).
33. Id. at 481, 488-89 (citing Berman, 348 U.S. at 31).
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debates over the wisdom of takings" are inappropriate. 3 4 Thus,
the Court looked only at the purpose, not the "mechanics," of the
35
condemnation.
Finally, and significantly, the Court noted that states may enact stronger limits on the eminent domain power than those existing under the Fifth Amendment. Thus, the Kelo decision is
largely irrelevant in a state that has a more stringent constitution
and more stringent statutes than the "federal baseline." 3 6
The Kelo Court was polarized, splitting five to four.3 7 That
division was mirrored in the legal and academic community,
where scholars have written hundreds of articles suggesting either that the decision reflected the status quo, 38 or on the other
hand, that it dramatically altered the constitutional law of emi39
nent domain.
But for most Americans, the opinion seemed to elicit a more
uniform, primal fear that the government could now single out a
person's property to give to the highest corporate bidder. In an
extreme response, one individual submitted a proposal to the town
of Weare, New Hampshire, to condemn Justice Souter's farmhouse there and turn it into a hotel on the grounds that it would
bring higher tax revenue to the town. 40 Justice Stevens seemed
himself to be haunted by the personal suffering the opinion
caused, confessing that it was "entirely divorced from [his] judgment concerning the wisdom of the program."4 1
Regardless of how one comes down on the Kelo decision, there
has been an undisputable galvanizing effect on those who view
property ownership as sacrosanct. The lawyers in Kelo took their
cause on the road, including in Montana, where they warned citi34. Id. at 487-88 (citing Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242).
35. Id. at 482 (citing Berman, 348 U.S. at 244).
36. Id. at 489.
37. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 470. Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
comprised the majority, while Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, along with Chief
Justice Rehnquist, comprised the minority. Id.
38. E.g. Marcilynn A. Burke, Much Ado about Nothing: Kelo v. City of New London,
Babbitt v. Sweet Home, and Other Tales from the Supreme Court, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 663
(Winter 2006).
39. E.g. Richard A. Epstein, Kelo: An American Original,8 Green Bag 2d 355 (Summer
2005).
40. The Associated Press, Eminent Domain This! Justice's Farm Is Target (June 29,
2005) (available at http://www.msnbc.com/id/8406056/) [hereinafter Eminent Domain
This!].
41. Michael C. Dorf, Justice Stevens Adds Fuel to the Fire over the New London Eminent Domain Case (Aug. 29, 2005) (available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/
20050829.html).
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zens about Kelo takings in the Big Sky State, and, in the words of
42
one commentator, "seemed intent on alarming us into action."
And while the warning did succeed in alarming Montana into action, the warning may have been unnecessary under the State's
eminent domain law.
II.
A.

MONTANA'S EMINENT DOMAIN LAW

General Condemnation Powers and Limitations

The Montana Constitution allows private property to be
taken only for "public use."4 3 Additionally, the Montana Constitution's Declaration of Rights grants all persons an inalienable right
to possess, enjoy, and protect property. 4 4 The Montana Supreme
Court has deemed this property right to be a fundamental right
45
that must be protected in the eminent domain process.
The Montana Code enumerates the types of public use that
qualify for eminent domain. 4 6 While the list is expansive, "economic development" is noticeably absent 4 7-a fact observed by national commentators surveying state eminent domain laws after
Kelo. 48 The list does include many traditional forms of condemnation for private ownership such as private roads to farms, telephone and power lines, various mining uses, and railways, but
Montanans seeking reform after Kelo appeared surprisingly unconcerned with these types of "private ownership" condemna42. Nancy Mahoney, Don't Fear the Blight: FearMontana State Laws, New West (Oct.
17, 2005) (available at http://www.newwest.net/index.php/main/article/dontfear the
blight-fear_montanastate-laws/) (reporting on an October 2005 speech in Bozeman, Montana, by Chip Mellor, president and counsel for the Institute for Justice).
43. Mont. Const. art. II, § 29.
44. Id. at art. II, § 3.
45. McCabe Petroleum Corp. v. Easement and Right-of-Way across Township 12 N.,
Range 23 E., 87 P.3d 479, 481, 483 (citing City ofBozeman v. Vaniman, 869 P.2d 790, 792
(1994)).
46. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 70-30-101, -102 (2007).
47. Admittedly, several of the listed public uses indirectly impact a community's economy, but economic development is not listed as a public use that could trigger condemnation in and of itself.
48. E.g. CCIM Inst., Use of Eminent Domain for Economic Development: Reaction to
Kelo by State Legislatures (June 2006) (available at http://www.ccim.com/members/govaffairs/pdffEminentDomain.pdf) (listing Montana as a state "forbiddingthe use of eminent
domain for economic development unless it is to eliminate blighted properties); Eminent
Domain This!, supra n. 40 (listing Montana among a small number of states that does not
allow condemnation for economic development); Hope Yena, Supreme Court Says Cities
Can Seize Homes for PrivateDevelopers, Billings Gaz. (June 23, 2005) (available at http:/l
www.billingsgazette.netlarticles/2005/06/23/nation/export2l2501.txt) (reporting the same).
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tions. 49 As discussed below, reformers instead focused on public
use number (12) in the Legislature's list-urban renewal projects
for blighted areas within cities-despite this public use being lim50
ited to blighted property that is beyond rehabilitation.
But before turning to urban renewal, the government's general evidentiary burden in a condemnation merits discussion.
Even when a particular condemnation falls within the Legislature's list of public uses, there are additional statutory limitations
on the government in Montana. The government must consider
the property rights of the affected landowner and show that the
use is "located in the manner that will be most compatible with
the greatest public good and the least private injury .... "51 The
government also bears the burden of proving by a "preponderance
of the evidence" that the use is a "public use," that "the public
interest requires the taking" and that the taking is "necessary to
the public use."52 The government is obliged to meet this burden
in a court of law. 53 Thus, even a brief survey of the Montana Constitution and Montana Code reveals several state limitations on
eminent domain that are stricter than the Kelo baseline. And
when examining Montana's urban renewal law in more detail, the
differences from Kelo become even more marked.
54

B. Montana's Urban Renewal Law
(Before the 2007 Legislative Session)

In 1959, an attorney for the Blackfeet Tribe stood before the
Montana Legislature's Committee on Affairs of Cities, urging it to
pass House Bill 335, the Urban Renewal Law. The attorney
drafted the bill to help the Tribe reclaim a blighted area called
Moccasin Flats in Browning, Montana, where a polio epidemic had
broken out the year before. He testified that the area "needs
49. See generally Mont. Code Ann. § 70-30-102 (2007) (listing some 45 categories of
public uses). Perhaps of most concern are the categories "all public uses authorized by the
government of the United States" and "all public uses permissible by the federal courts,
Congress, or any other federal agency," which are so broad as to potentially include economic development activities.
50. Mont. Code Ann. § 70-30-102(12). See infra pt. II.B.
51. Id. § 70-30-110(1).
52. Id. § 70-30-111(2).
53. Id.
54. This article does not address the underlying merits of urban renewal laws, which
have had a mixture of success, but rather examines the question of whether under
Montana's renewal law a Kelo taking could even occur. For a history and assessment of
urban renewal efforts nationwide, along with an extensive bibliography, see John C.
Teaford, Urban Renewal and Its Aftermath, 11 Hous. Policy Debate 443 (2000).
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cleaning up very badly . . . before some other serious disease
breaks out there." 5 5 The bill was similar to laws other states had
passed to take advantage of federal dollars available under Title I
of the federal Housing Act.56 Proponents believed the bill could be
an important reclamation tool not only for Browning but for other
Montana cities with slum areas,5 7 and the Legislature overwhelmingly enacted it into law, 58 reciting that:
[T]he prevention and elimination of [blighted] areas is a matter of
state policy and state concern in order that the state and its municipalities shall not continue to be endangered by areas which are focal
centers of disease, promote juvenile delinquency, are conducive to
fires, are difficult to police and to provide police protection for, and,
while contributing little to the tax income of the state and its municipalities, consume an excessive proportion of its revenues because of
the extra services required for police, fire, accident, hospitalization,
59
and other forms of public protection, services, and facilities.

Under the Urban Renewal Law,6 0 which saw relatively few
changes until 2007, municipalities can eliminate "blighted areas"
within an incorporated city or town that pose a "serious and growing menace, injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare" of municipal residents. 6 1 A "blighted area" is defined
through a list of over twenty potential characteristics, including
some of the obvious characteristics: "substantial physical dilapidation," "unsanitary or unsafe conditions," an "area that is conducive
to... crime," as well as land configurations that cause overcrowding or lack of access. 6 2 But there are also some characteristics
55. Mont. H. Comm. on Affairs of Cities, An Act to Provide for the Rehabilitation,Redevelopment, and Clearanceof Blighted Areas in Cities and Towns: Hearingon H.B. 335, 36th
Leg., Reg. Sess. 1 (Feb. 14, 1959) (written minutes) [hereinafter Feb. 14, 1959 H. Hrg.].
56. Id.; see also Teaford, supra n. 54, at 443-47.
57. Feb. 14, 1959 H. Hrg., supra n. 55.
58. Mont. H.J. 524-25, 36th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1959) (showing the House passed the bill
by a vote of 81 to 3); Mont. Sen. J. 520, 36th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1959) (showing the Senate
passed the bill by a vote of 41 to 11).
59. 1959 Mont. Laws 426-27 (now Mont. Code Ann. § 7-15-4202(3) (2007)).
60. The latest version of the Urban Renewal Law appears at Mont. Code Ann. §§ 7-154201 to -4324 (2007). This part of the discussion, however, focuses on the law existing prior
to the 2007 Legislative Session, which originally appeared at 1959 Mont. Laws 422-45.
Where the law changed in 2007, the change is noted.
61. Mont. Code Ann. § 7-15-4202(1) (2005 and 2007).
62. Id. at § 7-15-4206(2). The statute provides:
(2) "Blighted area" means an area that is conducive to ill health, transmission
of disease, infant mortality, juvenile delinquency, and crime; substantially impairs
or arrests the sound growth of the city or its environs; retards the provision of
housing accommodations; or constitutes an economic or social liability or is detrimental or constitutes a menace to the public health, safety, welfare, and morals in
its present condition and use, by reason of:
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that critics have described as "nebulous,"6 3 such as "diversity of
ownership," "inappropriate... uses of land," or "improper subdivision"-terms that could describe blighted areas, but also could ap64
ply to ordinary, maintained areas as well.
To designate a blighted area, a municipal governing body
must adopt a "resolution of necessity" finding that the area has
one or more of these statutory characteristics of blight and that
"rehabilitation, redevelopment, or a combination thereof of such
area or areas is necessary in the interest of the public health,
"65 The governing body then enacts
safety, morals, or welfare ....
a detailed "urban renewal plan" that guides the city's renewal actions within the blighted area. 6 6 This process is intended to be a
(a) the substantial physical dilapidation; deterioration; defective construction,
material, and arrangement; or age obsolescence of buildings or improvements,
whether residential or nonresidential;
(b) inadequate provision for ventilation, light, proper sanitary facilities, or
open spaces as determined by competent appraisers on the basis of an examination of the building standards of the municipality;
(c) inappropriate or mixed uses of land or buildings;
(d) high density of population and overcrowding;
(e) defective or inadequate street layout;
(f) faulty lot layout in relation to size, adequacy, accessibility, or usefulness;
(g) excessive land coverage;
(h) unsanitary or unsafe conditions;
(i) deterioration of site;
(j) diversity of ownership;
(k) tax or special assessment delinquency exceeding the fair value of the land;
(1) defective or unusual conditions of title;
(m) improper subdivision or obsolete platting;
(n) the existence of conditions that endanger life or property by fire or other
causes; or
(o) any combination of the factors listed in this subsection (2).
Id.
63. See e.g. Feb. 13, 2007 Sen. Hrg., infra n. 165, at 1:37:47-1:43:29 (Senator McGee
testifying); Feb. 19, 2007 Sen. Hrg., infra n. 155, at 1:44:50-1:47:30 (Senator O'Neil testifying that blighted is a "nebulous" term; proponent Tim Ravndal, Montana Multiple Use
Association, testifying that the definition of blight has "ruined communities" like in Kelo).
64. See e.g. Jan.24, 2007 Sen. Hrg., infra n. 178, at 28:45-31:29 (Senator Jent testifying that "one person's blight might be another person's charm").
65. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 7-15-4210, -4216 (2005 and 2007). Note that the Law contemplates renewal of blighted areas-not an isolated, targeted property. This is an additional
distinction from the "home-to-Home Depot" (one-to-one transfer) example often used by
Kelo reformers.
66. Mont. Code Ann. § 7-15-4206(18) (2005) (renumbered in 2007 as Mont. Code Ann.
§ 7-15-4206(19) (2007)). The statute provides:
"Urban renewal plan" means a plan for one or more urban renewal areas or for an
urban renewal project. The plan:
(a) must conform to the growth policy if one has been adopted pursuant to
Title 76, chapter 1; and
(b) must be sufficiently complete to indicate, on a yearly basis or otherwise:
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transparent one that always requires public notice and hearings,
and even voter approval if general obligation bonds are to be
67
used.
Under the Law, municipalities can use a variety of tools to
renew a designated blighted area, from voluntary landowner repair of the existing structure, 68 to compulsory repair, to government acquisition, demolition and new construction. 6 9 These renewal actions are classified as either "rehabilitation" or "redevelopment."7 0 While the definitions of these terms overlap to some
degree, rehabilitation appears to be aimed principally at property
restoration, 7 1 whereas redevelopment appears to be aimed principally at demolition and reconstruction for new uses that will prevent the recurrence of blight.7 2 As between rehabilitation and redevelopment, "to the extent feasible salvable blighted areas
should be rehabilitated through voluntary action and the regula73
tory process."
For non-salvable land that a municipality believes must be
redeveloped, the local government can acquire the land through
traditional property transfers such as lease or purchase, or it can
resort to eminent domain. 74 Historically, the Urban Renewal Law
has empowered a municipality to retain the acquired property for
municipal uses or dispose of the property through sale, lease, or
other transfer for residential, recreational, commercial, industrial,
(i) any land acquisition, demolition, and removal of structures; redevelopment;
improvements; and rehabilitation that is proposed to be carried out in the urban
renewal area;
(ii) zoning and planning changes, if any, including changes to the growth policy if one has been adopted pursuant to Title 76, chapter 1;
(iii) land uses, maximum densities, building requirements; and
(iv) the plan's relationship to definite local objectives respecting appropriate
land uses, improved traffic, public transportation, public utilities, recreational and
community facilities, and other public improvements.
Id. See also Mont. Code Ann. § 7-15-4217 (2005 and 2007) (providing criteria for local government approval of project).
67. Id. at §§ 7-15-4210 to -4218.
68. Id. at § 7-15-4206(16).
69. Id. at §§ 7-15-4203(1), -4206(15).
70. Id. at § 7-15-4203.
71. Id. at § 7-15-4206(16).
72. Mont. Code Ann. § 7-15-4206(15) (2005) (renumbered and amended in 2007 as
Mont. Code Ann. § 7-15-4206(16) (2007)).
73. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 7-15-4202, -4203(3), -4258, -4259 (2005 and 2007). The Montana Supreme Court has construed this statement as mandatory. See infra n. 110 and its
related discussion.
74. Mont. Code Ann. § 7-15-4258 (2005). The types of blighted property a city can condemn are more limited after passage of Mont. S.B. 363 in 2007. See infra pt. III.C and
related discussion.
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or other uses consistent with the renewal plan and the city's zoning. 75 When property is transferred, the transfer is to occur "as
rapidly as possible" and "shall afford maximum opportunity, consistent with the sound needs of the municipality as a whole, to the
rehabilitation or redevelopment of the urban renewal area by pri76
vate enterprise."
Reading these statutory provisions through the lens of Kelo,
critics had concerns that a "creative" city council could use one of
the "nebulous" characteristics of blight to designate an ordinary
property as "blighted" and then proceed to condemn the property
for future transfer to a private enterprise. 77 While no critic identified an instance when a Montana city has used the Urban Renewal Law to condemn even a legitimately blighted property for
resale to a private landowner, there is certainly no harm in foreclosing the possibility of abuse. But in rushing to close this potential loophole as a "Kelo" fix, reformers failed to appreciate that
Kelo did not involve blighted property. New London did not need
to show any characteristic of blight because it proceeded under
78
statutes allowing condemnation for pure economic development.
Reformers also failed to appreciate that the Urban Renewal Law
exists within the context of Montana's eminent domain jurisprudence-jurisprudence that offers unique private property protections not available under Kelo.
C. Montana's Eminent Domain Jurisprudence
1.

79

General Analytical Framework

In a relatively recent set of companion rulings in City of Bozeman v. Vaniman,8 0 the Montana Supreme Court laid the framework for analyzing condemnations that benefit private parties.
The Court held that private property ownership is a fundamental
75. Mont. Code Ann. § 7-15-4258. In 2007, S.B. 41 eliminated the power of government
to transfer condemned land to a private entity. See infra pt. II.D and related discussion.
76. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 7-15-4208, -4262, -4263.
77. Infra pts. III.B, III.C.
78. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480, 482-84 (2005).
79. This section does not attempt to comprehensively describe all aspects of Montana's
eminent domain law, but rather focuses on those aspects of the law relevant to potential
"economic development" condemnations for transfer to private enterprise. For a more
comprehensive description of Montana's eminent domain law, see Krista Lee Evans,
Eminent Domain in Montana (Legis. Envtl. Policy Off. 2001) (available at http://leg.mt.gov/
content/publications/lepo/200ledhandbook.pdf).
80. City ofBozeman v. Vaniman, 869 P.2d 790 (Mont. 1994) (hereinafter Vaniman 1);
City of Bozeman v. Vaniman, 898 P.2d 1208, 1210 (Mont. 1995) (hereinafter Vaniman II).
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right under Article II, Section 3 of the Montana Constitution, and
that this right is directly implicated in an eminent domain proceeding. 8 ' The Court added that in any condemnation, the government's eminent domain powers are "strictly construed."' 2 Further, it held that eminent domain statutes must be given a plain
interpretation "favoring the person's fundamental rights."8 3
Although the Court held that Montana's condemnation statutes are to be strictly construed, the Court did not state that the
condemnations pursuant to those statutes are subject to strict
scrutiny-perhaps a question saved for another day.8 4 In other
contexts the Court has stated that infringements of fundamental
rights do require strict scrutiny review:
Strict scrutiny of a legislative act requires the government to show a
compelling state interest for its action. When the government intrudes upon a fundamental right, any compelling state interest for
doing so must be [carried out through a means that is] closely tailored to effectuate only that compelling state interest. In addition to
the necessity that the State show a compelling state interest for invasion of a fundamental right, the State, to sustain the validity of
such invasion, must also show that the choice of legislative action is
the least onerous path that can be taken to achieve the state objec85
tive.

While the Court did not resolve the level of scrutiny issue in
the Vaniman cases, it did affirm that in condemnation proceedings the statutory burden of proof is on the government to show by
a "preponderance of the evidence" that the condemnation serves a
public use, that the public interest requires the condemnation,
and that the condemnation is necessary to the use.8 6 The govern81. Vaniman 1, 869 P.2d at 792.
82. Id.
83. Id. The Court's statement raises the question of whether the "plain meaning" of
statutes that expressly favor public use can truly be interpreted to favor a person's fundamental rights. The Court's additional citation to Montana Code Annotated § 1-2-104 may
shed some light on this question: "When a statute is equally susceptible of two interpretations, one in favor of natural right and the other against it, the former is to be adopted."
84. The possibility of strict scrutiny review raises the question of whether every statutory public use can be a compelling one in every case. Under strict scrutiny, it is unlikely a
condemnor could continue to rely solely on the statutory list of public uses to prove the first
element of a condemnation under Montana Code Annotated § 70-3-111. The condemnor
might have to show that the use is both allowed by statute as well as compelling under the
facts and circumstances of that particular case. Further, the "greatest public good" and
"least private injury" balancing test in Montana Code Annotated § 70-30-110 may place
more weight on the public's interest than the "closely tailored" means test under strict
scrutiny review.
85. Wadsworth v. State, 911 P.2d 1165, 1174 (Mont. 1996) (internal citations omitted).
86. Vaniman I, 869 P.2d at 792 (based on Mont. Code Ann. § 70-30-111). Curiously, the
Court goes on to state that a "government's finding of necessity is a political decision which
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ment also must, by statute, show that the use is physically "lowith the greatcated in the manner that will be most compatible
87
est public good and least private injury."
In Vaniman, the City of Bozeman wished to condemn land for
a highway interchange and visitor center. Based on the facts of
the case, the City presumably could have met its statutory burden
because: (1) the Legislature has listed both highway interchanges
and visitor's centers as public uses; 8 (2) the interchange was in
the public interest because the site would "rest in the middle of
the longest stretch of interstate highway in Montana which currently does not have a rest area;" 9 and (3) the interchange was
necessary to the public use because of its location and connection
90
with North 19th Avenue.
Where the City ran into trouble was in negotiating with the
Bozeman Chamber of Commerce-a private corporation-to locate its offices within a portion of the visitor center and to contribute toward the building costs. Under the City's preliminary plans,
the Chamber's offices would occupy forty percent of the space
within the visitor center. 9 1 The Vanimans disputed this private
use of their property, and appealed the district court's preliminary
condemnation order allowing the condemnation to proceed with
the Chamber's involvement. The Montana Supreme Court remanded, ordering the trial court to specifically consider whether
or not the Chamber's private use was merely de minimis in rela92
tion to the overall interchange project.
On remand, the district court concluded that the Chamber's
role in the interchange project was not de minimis, and that the
will not be overturned by the court absent proof of arbitrariness by clear and convincing
evidence." Id. at 793. The Court actually rejected this very standard of deference 20 years
earlier in light of the Legislature's clear placement of the burden of proof on the government. City of Helena v. DeWolf, 508 P.2d 122, 127 (Mont. 1973) ("Here we have the city
required to present proof of necessity; but, as shown above [under the district court's reasoning], wind up with the property owners having to prove by clear and convincing proof
lack of necessity!"). This earlier rejection makes more sense in light of both the statutory
burden of proof and the Court's statement in Vaniman I that it will strictly construe eminent domain powers in favor of a person's fundamental property ownership rights under
the Montana Constitution.
87. Mont. Code Ann. § 70-30-110. This requirement apparently was not at issue in the
case.
88. Vaniman I, 869 P.2d. at 793 (citing Mont. Code Ann. §§ 70-30-102(1)-(2), 60-1-102,
60-3-101, and 60-4-103(4)).
89. Id. at 792.
90. Id.
91. Vaniman 11, 898 P.2d at 1210.
92. Vaniman 1, 869 P.2d at 794.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/2

14

Bryan Mudd: Montana's Response to Kelo

2008

MONTANA'S RESPONSE TO KELO

City had to eliminate the Chamber's offices from its plans. 93 On a
second appeal, the Court upheld the district court, observing that
while some private "incidental benefits" can occur in eminent domain to "aid in the establishment of a public project," the private
use by the Chamber was such a significant part of the project as to
be constitutionally offensive. 9 4 In reaching its holding, the Court
fashioned the following three-part test for "incidental benefit":
(1) Will the public use create an "incidental" benefit to private individuals?
(2) Is the overall use that of the condemnor?
95
(3) Is the private use insignificant?
Under this three-part test, the Court deemed the Chamber's private use of the visitor center to be more than "purely incidental" or
6
a "corollary" to the public use. 9
Interestingly, the Petitioners in Kelo cited to the Vaniman
holdings when urging the U.S. Supreme Court to hold that New
London's planned use for the condemned properties was not incidental to a public use. 9 7 And during the 2007 Montana Legislative Session, some analysts cited the Vaniman holdings as prohibiting any condemnation on behalf of private enterprise and urged
the Legislature to codify that prohibition. 98
To be sure, the Court did not limit its three-part test to highway interchanges, leaving the impression that this test could apply whenever a private use results from condemnation. However,
the highway condemnation statutes do not expressly authorize
any private use, 99 and thus the Court was not doing anything revolutionary in concluding under the statute's "plain meaning" that
a private corporation could not use the visitor's center. One can
imagine a different outcome under some of the traditional condemnations such as telephone lines, power lines, private roads, or
other categories that expressly recognize private ownership as a
93. Vaniman 11, 898 P.2d at 1214. Although the Court has not yet stated that strict
scrutiny applies to the fundamental private property right under Article II, section 3 of the
Montana Constitution, it is interesting to note how the Court in effect more "closely tailored" the condemnation by eliminating the Chamber's private use.
94. Id.
95. Id. (citing Julius L. Sackman & Patrick Rohan, 2A Nichols on Eminent Domain,
The Public Use § 7.6 (2d ed. 1990)).
96. Id.
97. Petr.'s Br. at 47-48, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
98. Jan. 24, 2007 Sen. Hrg., infra n. 178, at 4:15-5:15, 17:08-18:42; Mar. 7, 2007 H.
Hrg., infra n. 169, at 2:15:10-2:15:40.
99. See Vaniman I, 869 P.2d 790, 793 (Mont. 1994) (The government cited Montana
Code Annotated §§ 60-1-102, 60-3-101, 60-4-103(4), 70-30-102(1) and (2), 70-30-110, and
70-30-111.).
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byproduct of the condemnation. 10 0 Similarly, the Urban Renewal
Law expressly contemplates that certain private enterprise can be
10 1
commingled with the public use of eliminating a blighted area.
The legal treatise from which the Court crafted its three-part
test indicates that urban renewal projects can benefit private interests in a way that is incidental to the overriding public purpose
of preventing slums and cleaning up blighted areas. 10 2 This analysis suggests that, depending on the extent of the private interest
involved in an urban renewal project, it could be either so significant as to defeat the public use, or it could be incidental enough to
be de minimis to the public use. Thus Vaniman, while clearly limiting the role of private enterprise in eminent domain, likely does
not foreclose all private enterprise as some analysts believe.
Regardless of the lingering questions about Vaniman's incidental benefit test, it is clear that condemnations in Montana will
be scrutinized-particularly when a private party may benefitbecause of Montana's fundamental right to private property ownership. And it is clear that Montana's judicial scrutiny is far more
stringent than the "federal baseline" set by Kelo. This scrutiny
was evident in 1973 when the Montana Supreme Court decided
the first and only condemnation appeal under the Urban Renewal
10 3
Law.
100. See generally Mont. Code Ann. § 70-30-102 (2007).
101. See supra pt. II.B and related discussion. Those who support private enterprise in
urban renewal argue that its role is a "public" one under the theory that the presence of
new structures that occurs after the removal of blight is critical to preventing the reversion
of blight. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34-35 (1954) (summarizing expert testimony:
"The entire area needed redesigning so that a balanced, integrated plan could be developed
for the region, including not only new homes, but also schools, churches, parks, streets, and
shopping centers. In this way it was hoped that the cycle of decay of the area could be
controlled and the birth of future slums prevented."). But see Teaford, supra n. 54, for a
critique of this position.
102. Julius L. Sackman & Russell D. Van Brunt, 2A Nichols on Eminent Domain, The
Public Use § 7.06[27] (3d ed. 2003) (renumbering the 1990 edition cited by the Court).
103. City of Helena v. DeWolf, 508 P.2d 122, 127 (Mont. 1973). There may have been one
additional landowner challenge in Helena that was rendered moot by the demolition of the
building, but the underlying facts are unreported. See generally Burke v. City of Helena,
497 P.2d 95 (Mont. 1972). This of course does not mean urban renewal has been a flawless
process in Montana. See e.g. Fletcher v. City of Helena, 517 P.2d 365 (Mont. 1973) (a negligence case against the City that arose when a relocated Helena landowner nearly died from
a gas leak in her new apartment); Gallagherv. Johnson, 611 P.2d 613 (Mont. 1980) (a libel
case that arose from published statements attacking Anaconda's Urban Renewal Director).
Further, as some commentators note, the landowners subject to this type of condemnation
often lack the financial resources to challenge the government's action. See e.g. Kelo v. City
of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 522 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (" 'Of all the families
displaced by urban renewal from 1949 through 1963, 63 percent of those whose race was
known were nonwhite, and of these families, 56 percent of nonwhites and 38 percent of
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2. Analysis under the Urban Renewal Law
In City of Helena v. DeWolf, the Montana Supreme Court indicated in multiple ways that local governments do not have carte
blanche to condemn non-blighted properties based on urban renewal. DeWolf, which preceded Vaniman by two decades, did not
involve a condemnation for a private developer (rather, a public
street and parking lot), but it nonetheless provided strong indicia
of the narrow circumstances under which such a condemnation
could occur.
In DeWolf, the City of Helena designated its downtown as an
urban renewal area, in which it sought to eliminate blight, to install public improvements, 10 4 to add housing for the elderly, and
to attract commercial redevelopment (an outdoor shopping center
with a walking mall) that would prevent the recurrence of
blight. 10 5 Within the plan area, the City deemed eighty-nine percent of the buildings to be what it termed "deficient." 1 06 Although
the record is not clear, the "non-deficient" buildings within the renewal area presumably were included because the City believed it
needed the properties to redesign the renewal area as a whole.
The Union Market property apparently was one of the "nondeficient" buildings. The property, which consisted of four lots on
which the Union Market operated and five other stores rented
space, fell just inside the renewal area. Although the property
needed some improvements to be brought up to code, the property
was not substandard or blighted. 10 7 The reason the City included
the property in the renewal area was because it wanted to
straighten a street that angled around the property, and it wanted
to demolish the commercial structures to provide public parking
for the future businesses it hoped to attract to the downtown. The
City was able to acquire ninety percent of the land within the rewhites had incomes low enough to qualify for public housing, which, however, was seldom
available to them.' ") (quoting Bernard J. Frieden & Lynne B. Sagalyn, Downtown, Inc.:
How America Rebuilds Cities 17 (MIT Press 1989)).
104. The public improvements included streets, sidewalks, curbs, gutters, storm sewers,
and parking areas. DeWolf, 508 P.2d at 124. Such infrastructure is a natural component of
urban renewal because blighted areas often have poor street and lot layout that require
redesign. See Mont. Code Ann. § 7-15-4206(2)(e), (f).
105. DeWolf, 508 P.2d at 124.
106. Id. at 124, 127. And within the area, the City did considerable "picking and choosing" by exempting some structures due to their historical or architectural significance.
107. Id. at 123-24.
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property refused
newal area, but the owners of the Union Market
108
to sell, sending the matter into condemnation.
The Court, reversing the district court's preliminary order of
condemnation, held that the City could not take the Union Market
property because the taking was neither necessary to the urban
renewal plan nor designed to ensure the least private injury. 10 9
The decision rested on several key conclusions.
First, the Court observed that the Union Market property was
not blighted, that the Urban Renewal Law favored rehabilitation,
and that "redevelopment is proper only when reclamation of an
area by rehabilitation is impractical."'1 0 Yet the City had bypassed the rehabilitation option in favor of redevelopment without
making any showing of impracticality. The Court, however, did
not use this rule to require rehabilitation. Rather, the Court went
through a series of steps that eliminated the Union Market property from the renewal plan altogether.
Because the Union Market property was not blighted, the
Court held that the City needed to make the case that demolition
of the businesses involved was otherwise necessary to the urban
renewal project and that the condemnation was located where the
least private injury would result. The Court then iterated the definition of necessity as "reasonable, requisite, and proper for the
accomplishment of the end in view, under the particular circumstances of the case." 1 1
The Court also declined to "presume" that the condemnation
was necessary simply because the City had passed an ordinance
designating the area as blighted and declaring the necessity of
condemnation to remedy the blight. 1 12 In other words, the City
did not receive deference to its own governmental determination
that the condemnation was necessary-even though it had extensive studies upon which it based its ordinance. 11 3 Instead, the
108. Id. at 124.
109. Id. at 129-30.
110. Id. at 124, 126 (citing what is now Mont. Code Ann. §§ 7-15-4203). The statute's
wording differs from that of the Court's in a couple of ways. First, the statute uses the
word "feasible" rather than the notion of "practical." Second, the statute says property
"should be" rehabilitated rather than requiring rehabilitation. This semantic difference
may be an additional reason why the case did not turn on the City's failure to address
rehabilitation.
111. DeWolf, 508 P.2d at 128 (citing St. Hwy. Comm. v. Yost Farm Co., 384 P.2d 277,279
(Mont. 1963)).
112. Id. at 126.
113. Id. at 124, 126-27 (noting that there was an 18-month planning stage and engineering and planning studies).
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Court held that the City still carried the evidentiary burden in the
condemnation proceeding to show that the condemnation was necessary. 11 4 And while the Court did not mention the "strict construction" standard that would later surface in Vaniman, the
Court's approach reflected a similar willingness to scrutinize the
government's condemnation in favor of private property rights.
The Court further rejected the City's argument that it need
only prove the necessity of condemning the urban renewal area as
a whole, and not the necessity of condemning an individual property within the area. 115 Although the City cited United States Supreme Court precedent 1 6 and "literally dozens of cases throughout the nation" that only considered the condemnation of the renewal area as a whole, the Montana Supreme Court in DeWolf
proceeded to question whether the individual Union Market property was necessary to the "clearance of the blighted area and prevention of its recurrence."" 7 Again, the Court's decision-without
saying as much-seems to parallel Vaniman's "strict construction" approach of questioning a discrete piece of a condemnation
because of its effect on a fundamental private property right protected by the Montana Constitution. The Court's decision would
also be consistent with strict scrutiny review because it resulted
in a more closely tailored means to achieve urban renewal in Helena.
Zeroing in on the Union Market property, the Court then examined the specific uses (street alignment and parking space) the
City intended for the property to determine whether the uses were
indeed necessary and located to ensure the least private injury." 8
After sifting through "considerable" oral and documentary evidence from the proceedings below, the Court concluded that the
City had not carried its burden with regard to the Union Market
property. 1 9 As to the street alignment, the Court observed that a
ten-foot shifting of the street could avoid the property without interfering with the effectiveness of the renewal area-a result with
114. Id. at 126, 129 ("Had the Legislature intended the urban renewal's determination of
necessity to be final, it would have been unnecessary to thereafter declare what evidence
would be admissible at a hearing on necessity."). While the Court did not directly cite the
"preponderance of evidence" burden that the eminent domain statutes impose on government, this portion of the ruling aligns itself with that burden.
115. Id. at 122, 127.
116. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
117. DeWolf, 508 P.2d at 127-28.
118. Id. at 128.
119. Id. at 124.
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less private injury. 120 As to the parking spaces for future businesses in the planned shopping center, the Court observed that
the actual arrival of those businesses was not certain, and thus
the City could not show a "present need nor a need in the reasonably foreseeable future" for those particular parking spaces. 121 The
Court thus measured the necessity for parking against "the reasonable probability of the success of the Urban Renewal development."'1 2 2 Without this showing, the Court opined that "the only
limitation upon the amount of property that could be acquired...
1 23
is the architect's imagination."'
Ultimately, the Court was not comfortable permitting the destruction of a "going business" based simply on the "indefinite future when it just might be needed"-even if local government, engineers, and planners had studied the downtown's blight and determined that the street and parking needs were "completely
interwoven with" the renewal plan as a whole.' 24 Because the renewal plan could proceed without the Union Market property, the
25
Court ordered that the property be excluded from the project.
Considering that the Montana Supreme Court denied an urban renewal condemnation for a public parking lot and street realignment, it is difficult to imagine the Court approving a city's
"creative" use of an urban renewal condemnation to take an unblighted neighborhood residence for a private developer. Thus,
when reviewing Montana case law along with Montana's condemnation statutes, the difference between Montana law and Kelo's
federal baseline appears even more pronounced.
D. A Summary of the Differences between
Montana Law and Kelo
By placing Montana's Constitution, eminent domain statutes,
and eminent domain jurisprudence alongside the Kelo decision, it
becomes apparent that the New London condemnations could not
120. Id. at 128. The Court later cited a rule that a condemnor's choice of location is
given "great weight" due to its "expertise and detailed knowledge," but that if the condemnor "fails to consider the question of the least private injury between alternate routes
equal in terms of public good, its action is arbitrary and amounts to an abuse of discretion."
Id. at 129. Presumably the Court had this rule in mind when it declined to give weight to
the City's choice of street location.
121. Id. at 128.
122. Id. at 129.
123. DeWolf, 508 P.2d at 129.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 128, 129.
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happen in Montana. And as the Kelo decision reminds us, a more
stringent state condemnation law would indeed make Kelo's federal analysis largely irrelevant.
Foremost, Montana law does not authorize economic development as a public use, and Montana courts, which "strictly construe" the public uses listed in Montana Code Annotated § 70-30102, cannot read in such a use by implication. By contrast, Connecticut has an extensive statutory scheme that expressly recognizes condemnations for economic development regardless of the
condition of the property taken. 126 If New London were a city in
Montana, it would have no statutory method to take the Dery
Family's homes nor Susette Kelo's home for pure economic development. Nor could the city have taken the homes under Montana's Urban Renewal Law, because the area New London revitalized was not a blighted area. New London would have been stuck
negotiating with the landowners or leaving the land intact and
simply revitalizing the neighborhood around the existing homes.
Although Montana's public use statutes alone would have
halted New London in its tracks, exploring some additional legal
contrasts with Kelo are worthwhile. For example, suppose New
London had designated an urban renewal area under Montana
law and "creatively" designated the property within it-including
the Dery and Kelo properties-as "blighted." Now recall that DeWolf held that redevelopment is proper only when rehabilitation is
impractical. 12 7 Under that holding, the City would have to provide affirmative evidence showing why rehabilitation is not an option and why demolition and redevelopment is necessary. Since
the Dery and Kelo properties were not in poor condition, and did
not require demolition, this threshold showing would go unmet.
Further, a Montana court would not simply assess the legitimacy of the overall renewal plan and then stop its analysis as the
U.S. Supreme Court did in Kelo. Instead, the necessity of condemning the Dery and Kelo properties would be front and center.
Consider this statement by the U.S. Supreme Court:
It is not for the courts to oversee the choice of the boundary line nor
to sit in review on the size of a particular project area. Once the
question of public purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a particular

126. See e.g. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 8-186 (West 2007).
127. See supra nn. 73, 110, and related discussion.
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tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the
128
legislative branch.
Now consider this statement by the Montana Supreme Court:
Where it is shown, as here, that the property is not reasonably necessary to the clearance of the blighted area and prevention of its
recurrence, the "area concept" does not prevail ....

[The property

here] can be eliminated from the project without harming the balThe Urban Renewal plan can be amended for
ance of the project.
12 9
that purpose.

Further, in scrutinizing the necessity of the individual condemnations, a Montana court-unlike the U.S. Supreme Courtwould not extend deference to New London's governmental assessment that its condemnation was for a public use. Instead, due
to Montana's fundamental right of private property ownership, a
court would scrutinize the condemnation-perhaps even applying
the strict scrutiny review it has used with other fundamental

rights. 130
Our statutes also would require New London to show by a
"preponderance of the evidence" that it was necessary to condemn
the Dery Family and Kelo homes for the urban renewal project,
and to show that the condemnation effected the "least private injury" to the Derys and Ms. Kelo-evidence the city did not have to
produce under Kelo.131
Under DeWolf, New London also would have to convince a
Montana court that its renewal plan had a reasonable probability
of success and that the Dery and Kelo properties were needed now
or in the reasonably foreseeable future for the project to be successful. 13 2 Would one less business in the ninety-acre development at Fort Trumball mean the demise of the whole plan? If not,
a court could simply carve the properties out of the plan altogether
as it did in DeWolf.
Finally, a Montana court may apply Vaniman's three-part
test to determine whether the private aspects of New London's
128. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005) (citing Berman v. Parker,348
U.S. 26, 35-36 (1954)).
129. DeWolf, 508 P.2d at 128.
130. See supra nn. 81-85 and related discussion. While there is always a risk that the
Montana Supreme Court will decline to follow its own precedent in the future, the consistencies between DeWolf and the Vaniman cases, which span 20 years, along with the
Court's history of safeguarding fundamental rights in the Montana Constitution, suggest a
likelihood that the Court will continue to strictly construe the government's exercise of
eminent domain.
131. See supra nn. 86-87, 111 and related discussion.
132. See supra n. 119 and related discussion.
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condemnation were so significant to the public use as to offend the
Montana Constitution. A visual, side-by-side comparison of Kelo's
law and Montana law may be helpful.
TABLE OF COMPARISON
Kelo

Montana

Construes "public use" broadly to
mean a "public purpose" and
imposes a rational basis standard of
review of the condemnation,

Recognizes a fundamental right to
private property ownership under
the Montana Constitution and
strictly construes "public use."
There is the potential for strict scrutiny review due to the fundamental
right involved.

A state statute expressly lists economic development as a public use
without regard to the condition of
the property taken.

The "public use" statutes are strictly
construed in favor of private property rights, and there is no state
statute authorizing economic devel1 33
There is
opment as a public use.
an urban renewal statute applicable
only in blighted areas that (before
2007) would allow a condemnation
for demolition and redevelopment if
the property could not be rehabilitated.

Gives deference to the city's assessment of public use at the time it
creates the redevelopment area.

Does not give deference to the city's
assessment of public use at the time
it creates a renewal district, but
rather requires that the city show
the necessity of the public use by a
preponderance of the evidence in a
judicial proceeding.

Only reviews the overall redevelopment area as a whole in deciding
whether the condemnation is valid,
and will not review individual
properties on a piecemeal basis.

Reviews the specific piece of property within the renewal area. Also
requires the condemnation to effect
the "least private injury" to the particular property, and may order the
city to remove the property from the
renewal area if the city does not
meet its burden. May apply
Vaniman's three-part test for incidental private use to further limit
private enterprise on the property.

Does not require the city to show
the probability that the redevelopment plan will be successful,

Requires the city to show a reasonable probability of success for the
renewal plan to establish a present
or reasonably foreseeable future
need for the property.

133. See infra n. 156 and related discussion. S.B. 363 made this lack of authorization
more explicit by expressly prohibiting urban renewal for the purpose of increasing "government tax revenue."
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As this side-by-side comparison shows, Montana eminent domain law is markedly different than the federal and Connecticut
law underlying Kelo. And because Montana law is more stringent
than the Kelo baseline, Montana law-not Kelo-has governed,
and still does, in Montana. 13 4 Unfortunately, public clamor for a
Kelo "fix" in the Big Sky State overshadowed any meaningful
analysis of Montana's private property protections.
III.

MONTANA's RESPONSES TO KELO

Despite significant legal obstacles to a Kelo taking in Montana, there have been several recent attempts to pass legislation
that professed to protect Montanans from losing their homes like
the landowners in Kelo. Some of the key legislative responses are
135
worth examination.
A.

Initiative 1-154

Dubbed the "Protect Our Homes" initiative by its proponents,
1-154 was speeding toward the November 2006 voter ballot in
Montana. As proponents gathered approximately 36,000 signatures statewide, 13 6 they pitched the initiative with statements
such as:
Last year, the U.S. Supreme Court's Kelo decision ruled that government could use eminent domain to seize your property and retransfer it to a mall developer. You could have a big box store where
your living room once was. The only justification needed for bulldozing your home is government's desire to collect higher taxes from
a commercial development. The Court ruled this broader eminent
domain interpretation would apply unless your state passes a law
137
like 1-154 that prohibits this abuse.
134. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005).
135. In addition to the bills discussed here, several additional bills were requested and
assigned numbers and short titles, but never advanced through the drafting process: S.B.
536 ("revise eminent domain laws"); L.C. 0059 ("revise eminent domain laws"): L.C. 0737
("revise eminent domain laws"); L.C. 0807 ("revise eminent domain laws"); L.C. 1281 ("prohibit eminent domain for private development"); L.C. 1636 ("revise eminent domain law");
and L.C. 2037 ("revise eminent domain and regulatory taking law"). The topic among policy makers was, to say the least, a popular one.
136. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Or. Invalidating Certification of CI-98,
CI-97, and 1-154 at 20, Montanans for Just. v. State, Cause No. CDV-06-1162(d) (Mont. 8th
Dist. 2006). The final count was over 10,000 more signatures than needed to get the measure on the ballot. Id.
137. Montana Secretary of State, Voters, Election Resources: Ballot Issues, 2006 Ballot
Issues: 1-154, Argument for 1-154, http://sos.mt.gov/elb/archives/2006/ILforI-154.asp (accessed Feb. 26, 2008) [hereinafter Argument for 1-154].
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Or, more succinctly: "Keep that new eminent domain law from
138
coming to Montana and taking our homes away."
Statements like these underscore the powerful role that fear
played in Montana's response to Kelo. Who wouldn't sign a petition when threatened with losing the family home to Home Depot?
But the signature gatherers, many of whom were paid according
to the volume of signatures they could gather, 13 9 either did not
understand or chose not to explain whether Montana's current
law would even allow such a tragedy to occur.
The text of the initiative stated that government could not use
eminent domain "with an intention to directly or indirectly transfer a possessory interest in the property taken to another private
party ....
",140 Interestingly, the initiative then stated that an exception to this rule would be the public uses enumerated in Montana Code Annotated § 70-30-102.141 The initiative essentially
proposed a rule that would keep Montana's eminent domain powers the same.
By carving out § 70-30-102, the initiative excepted urban renewal from its purview. But the initiative did so expressly a second time by excepting blighted properties. 14 2 In what may be its
only true limits on a condemnation for private property, the initiative did raise the government's burden of proof to "clear and convincing" before it could condemn blighted property for transfer to
private ownership, and stated that the showing must "separately
account" for each property taken (presumably reacting to Kelo's
"area as a whole" analysis). This change would have codified existing case law since DeWolf already held that the government
must account for individual condemnations within an urban renewal area. 14 3 Thus, the prime target for Kelo reform in Montana
(urban renewal) was nearly untouched by the initiative, though
138. See Ray Ring, Taking Liberties, High Country News (July 24, 2006), http://www.hcn
.org/servlets/hcn.Article?articleid= 16409.
139. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Or. Invalidating Certification of CI-98,
CI-97, and 1-154 at 5, Montanans for Just. v. State, Cause No. CDV-06-1162(d) (Mont. 8th
Dist. 2006). For a story on signature gatherer Eric Dondero, see Ring, supra n. 138.
140. Mont. Initiative 154 § 5(1) (2006) (available at http://sos.mt.gov/elb/archives/2006/I/
I-154.asp) [hereinafter 1-154].
141. Id. at § 5(1)(b).
142. Id. at § 5(1)(a) (defining blighted property as "improved or unimproved property
that constitutes a danger to the safety and health of the community by reason of dilapidation, lack of ventilation, light and sanitary facilities, deleterious land use or any combination of these factors ... ).

143. See supra n. 156 and related discussion.
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the initiative may have meaningfully raised government's evidentiary burden for urban renewal condemnations.
So why go to all the trouble of getting 1-154 on the ballot if it
did not truly reform Montana's eminent domain laws? According
to opponents of the measure, 1-154 was a "bait-and-switch" initiative.1 4 4 Proponents more benignly termed it "Kelo-plus."14 5 While
eminent domain reform was the hook, the true reform was a regulatory (non-physical) takings provision that recognized a taking if
a regulation resulted in "diminished value or economic loss to the
private party subject to the government regulation."14 6 The provision required government compensation or a waiver of the regulation for the affected landowner-what some have termed a "payor-waive" regulation1 47 similar to Oregon's much publicized Measure 37. Opponents asserted that the initiative would essentially
hand a "blank check" to developers and "derail" land use planning
in Montana at a time when development is skyrocketing.1 48 Proponents described the measure as giving voters "a chance to say
how far regulations can go without compensating landowners
when their property values are reduced by land-use regulations." 149 Regardless of how one feels about regulatory takings, it
is disconcerting that such a sweeping change-unrelated to
Kelo-could rest principally on Montana's fearful response to a
Kelo taking.
1-154 was not Montana-inspired, but rather funded by out-of1 50
state interests working on similar laws in five other states.
While there may be nothing extraordinary about outside special
interests using the Montana initiative process, the popularity of
the one-size-fits-all "Kelo-plus" initiative further suggests that
144. Montana Secretary of State, Voters, Election Resources: Ballot Issues, 2006 Ballot
Issues: 1-154, Opponent's Rebuttal, http://sos.mt.gov/elb/archives/2006/lI/forI-154.asp (accessed Feb. 26, 2008) [hereinafter Rebuttal to Argument for 1-154].
145. Leonard C. Gilroy, Statewide Regulatory Takings Reform: Exporting Oregon's Measure 37 to Other States 24 (Reason Found. Apr. 2006) (available at http://www.reason.org/
ps343.pdf).
146. 1-154, supra n. 140.
147. Rebuttal to Argument for 1-154, supra n. 144.
148. E.g. id; Gilroy, supra n. 145; Ring, supra n. 138.
149. E.g. Terry L. Anderson, Backlash, Prop. & Env. Research Ctr., http://www.perc.org/
perc.php?subsection=5&id=830 (accessed Feb. 26, 2008).
150. See Ring, supra n. 138 (identifying Americans for Limited Government and Howie
Rich, a New York City "real estate mogul" and board member of the Cato Institute in
Washington, D.C., as the principal funding sources for the Montana initiative); Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Or. Invalidating Certification of CI-98, CI-97, and 1-154 at 6,
Montanans for Just. et al. v. State, Cause No. CDV-06-1162(d) (Mont. 8th Dist. 2006) (noting that unidentified out-of-state national organizations provided financial backing).
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meaningful analysis of Montana eminent domain law was lacking
as Montana rushed to respond to Kelo.
Despite having around 10,000 more signatures than required, 1 5 1 1-154 (along with two other initiatives) was ultimately
stricken from the ballot due to findings that some signature gatherers had employed improper practices in gathering and reporting
152
signatures.
B.

Montana Senate Bill 477

In the 2007 Montana Legislature, proposed Senate Bill 477
(S.B. 477) went further than 1-154 by altogether eliminating urban renewal as a public use under Montana Code Annotated § 7030-102 and striking all eminent domain provisions from the Urban Renewal Law.' 5 3 This bill would have allowed cities to continue urban renewal, but only on properties where the landowner
willingly sells the property. Thus, a landowner with blighted
property within an urban renewal area could refuse to sell the
property and a municipality would have no power to condemnregardless of whether the municipality wished to use property for
54
a public use or private enterprise.
Although the bill's sponsor stated that his principal concern
was the "nebulous" definition of blight, 55 which could allow cities
to take even non-dilapidated property, the bill simply abolished
condemnation of all blighted properties rather than tighten the
Law's definition. Proponents of S.B. 477 cited Kelo as an example
of how the "blight" laws have "ruined communities," and encouraged the bill's passage to do away with this "abuse of
151. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Or. Invalidating Certification of CI-98,
CI-97, and 1-154 at 20, Montanans for Just. v. State, Cause No. CDV-06-1162(d) (Mont. 8th
Dist. 2006).
152. Montanans for Just. v. St. ex rel. McGrath, 146 P.3d 759, 777-78 (Mont. 2006).
153. Mont. Sen. 477, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. 1-4 (Feb. 13, 2007) (available at http://laws.
leg.mt.gov/pls/lawsO7/law0203w$.startup).
154. The municipality may be able to force the demolition of the structure if it were a
safety hazard under public nuisance law (Mont. Code Ann. § 27-3-204 (2005)), but the land
would nonetheless remain vacant or otherwise at the landowner's disposal and unavailable
for use in renewing the blighted area.
155. Mont. Sen. Jud. Comm., An Act to Eliminate Urban Renewal as Public Use for Eminent Domain: Hrg. on Sen. 477, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. 1:44:50-1:46:25 (Feb.19, 2007) (audio
file) (available at http://leg.mt.gov/css/committees/standing/minutes/07minwrittenaudio
.asp?Chamber=senate) [hereinafter Feb. 19, 2007 Sen. Hrg.] (Senator O'Neil testifying).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2008

27

Montana Law Review, Vol. 69 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 2

106

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 69

power. '15 6 A representative of the Montana League of Cities and
Towns, on the other hand, opposed the bill, offering a "burned-out
building" scenario where a city would be unable to condemn and
clear a harmful structure under S.B. 477. The representative did
agree that the blight definition was broad enough that a city could
take unfair advantage, but assured legislators, "we don't do that
in Montana." 15 7 Ultimately, S.B. 477 died in standing committee-presumably because two other Democrat-sponsored bills
dealing with eminent domain had already passed out of committee
and would soon become law. Those bills were Senate Bills 363
and 41.
C.

Montana Senate Bill 363

In its original formulation, Senate Bill 363 (S.B. 363) was little more than a bill of reassurance, primarily reiterating existing
Montana law. For example, the bill limited condemnation for urban renewal to blighted property,1 5 8 which was already the case
under the Urban Renewal Law. 159 S.B. 363 also precluded eminent domain if the purpose of an urban renewal project "is to increase government tax revenue" 160 and required that government
show a condemnation is necessary for a "public" use.161 Since
Montana law already required that condemnation be for a "public
use,"162 and its public use statute has never authorized "tax revenue" as a category of condemnation, 16 3 these parts of the bill also
seemed more a reassurance for the public's benefit than a genuine
change in the law. Indeed, the bill's sponsor admitted that although she believed Montana law in its current formulation likely
prevented a Kelo taking, S.B. 363 was necessary to placate the
fears of Montanans. 16 4
156. Id. at 1:46:34-1:47:30 (audio file) (testimony of Tim Ravndal, Mont. Mult. Use Assoc.). The Montana Multiple Use Association, based in Townsend, Montana, has a website
at http://www.montanamua.org (accessed Feb. 26, 2008).
157. Id. at 1:48:03-1:52:13 (audio file) (testimony of Alec Hansen). Based on the 50-year
absence of litigation, Mr. Hansen may be correct, but it is doubtful that Montanans in a
post-Kelo world would take comfort in such a promise.
158. Mont. Sen. 363, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Jan. 26, 2007) (available at http://laws.leg.mt
.gov/pls/laws07/lawO2O3w$.startup).
159. Mont. Code Ann. § 7-15-4259(2) (2005).
160. Mont. Sen. 363, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. at 2.
161. Id. at 4.
162. Mont. Const. art. II,§ 29; Mont. Code Ann. § 70-30-101.
163. Mont. Code Ann. § 70-30-102.
164. Mont. H. Jud. Comm., An Act to Revise Eminent Domain Law: Hearingon S.B. 363,
60th Leg., Reg. Sess. 3:02:14-3:06:02 (Mar. 23, 2007) (audio file) (available at http://leg.mt.
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In the end, however, S.B. 363 became more surgical in its approach by narrowing the use of eminent domain in urban renewal
to selected types of blighted property-namely, the dilapidated,
unsanitary, or unsafe properties traditionally associated with
blight.165 A city could still purchase property deemed blighted
under some of the more "nebulous" characteristics such as "improper subdivision" or "inadequate street layout," but it could not
condemn those properties. 166 Thus, the "burned-out building"
owned by a recalcitrant landowner would still be within the reach
of eminent domain, but other non-dilapidated properties would
not.
The broad support for S.B. 363 underscored the far-ranging
dissatisfaction with Kelo in Montana. Supporters included the
Montana Association of Realtors, Montana Audubon Association,
Montana League of Cities and Towns, Montana Trial Lawyers Association, Montana Trout Unlimited, Montana Stock Growers Association, Montana Conservation Voters, Montana Environmental
Information Center, and the Montana Farm Bureau, among
others. 16 7 Governor Schweitzer signed S.B. 363 into law, announcing, "[tihe government ought not to pick winners and
losers."1 68 Even though this bill also rode in on the Kelo wave, its
changes reflected a more analytical response to Kelo by eliminating the possibility-albeit a remote one-that a non-dilapidated
structure in the urban renewal area (like the Union Market propgov/css/committees/standing/minutes/O7minwrittenaudio.asp?Chamber=house)
[hereinafter Mar. 23, 2007 H. Hrg] (Senator Kaufmann testifying).
165. Mont. Sen. 363, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. at 2 (limiting eminent domain to blighted
areas containing the characteristics in Mont. Code Ann. § 7-15-4206(a), (h), (k), or (n), to
the exclusion of the remaining characteristics). Even though the House Committee on Judiciary drafted this amendment, much of the credit for this result goes to Senator McGee,
who first walked the bill sponsor through some of the potential loopholes in the blight definition. See Mont. H. Jud. Comm., An Act to Revise Eminent Domain Law: Hearing on S.B.
363, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess 1:37:47-1:45:54 (Feb. 13, 2007) (audio file) [hereinafter Feb. 13,
2007 Sen. Hrg.].
166. Id. The actual definition of blight remained untouched because of an assessment
that the broad definition is tied to federal and state financial assistance available to both
local governments and private enterprises conducting urban renewal-assistance that the
Legislature did not wish to limit. See Mont. H. Jud. Comm., An Act to Revise Eminent
Domain Law: Executive Action on S.B. 363, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. 2:10:47-2:15:13 (Apr. 2,
2007, 9:00 a.m.) (audio file).
167. Mar. 23, 2007 H. Hrg., supra n. 164, at 6-7 (written minutes).
168. Associated Press, Governor Signs Bill Limiting Eminent Domain Authority, Billings Gaz. (May 17, 2007) (available at http://www.billingsgazette.net/artices/2007/05/17/
news/state/25-bill.prt) (indicating supporters felt the bill's clarifications were necessary
"because public fear of the Kelo case was used to advance an initiative last year [1-154
which they felt went too far by 'gutting' local planning authority").
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erty in Helena) could be condemned. While the DeWolf decision
would likely prevent that outcome in any event, this legislation
codified the balance between protecting ordinary neighborhood
properties and allowing municipalities to mitigate and prevent
the recurrence of true blight in a community. Unfortunately, the
Legislature did not stop with S.B. 363 but instead rushed to embrace another Kelo-fix that would take that balance away.
D. Montana Senate Bill 41
Senate Bill 41 (S.B. 41) completely prohibited a city from condemning property for urban renewal "with the intent to sell, lease,
or provide the property to a private entity."1 69 While the bill initially required a ten-year holding period before making a transfer
to private enterprise, the House Committee on Judiciary eliminated the ten-year holding period just hours after drafting S.B.
363's more limited list of situations when a city could condemn
blighted properties for urban redevelopment. 1 70 As the sponsor of
S.B. 363 stated, S.B. 41 would "shut down" a city's ability to eliminate certain blighted areas. 1 7 1 The Montana League of Cities and
Towns similarly objected, stating that the bill would "saddle taxpayers with the cost of owning and maintaining a lot of surplus
properties" because a city may have to condemn and demolish a
dilapidated property but would then be unable to recoup the cost
or redevelop the property through partnerships with private enterprise.1 7 2 Recall, again, that the focus is on non-salvable properties that are unable to be rehabilitated through either voluntary
owner action or compulsory repair, thus requiring condemnation
and demolition.1 7 3 A poignant example offered by one planner
was that of abandoned industrial land held by out-of-state owners
169. Mont. Sen. 41, 60th Leg., 1 Reg. Sess. 6 (Nov. 21, 2006) (available at http://Iaws.leg.
mt.gov/pls/lawsO7/lawO2O3w$.startup). Some critics suggest that "intent" is an "easy provision to work around." 50 State Report Card, supra n. 16, at 30 (giving Montana a "D" on
the Legislation Report Card); but see Mont. H. Jud. Comm., An Act to Narrow Uses for
Eminent Domain Law: Hearing on S.B. 41, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. 1:43:00-1:44:40 (Mar. 7,
2007) (audio file) [hereinafter Mar. 7, 2007 H. Hrg.] (exchange between Senator Elliot and
Representative Kottrel, evidencing legislative intent that the provision apply even if a city
acquires the property for other purposes and later decides to transfer an interest to a private entity).
170. Mont. H. Jud. Comm., An Act to Narrow Uses for Eminent Domain Law: Executive
Action on S.B. 41, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. 7:00-11:25 (Apr. 2, 2007, 6:00 p.m.) (audio file).
171. Mar. 23, 2007 H. Hrg., supra n. 164, at 3:06:02-3:07:02 (testimony of Senator Kaufmann).
172. Id. at 3:31:49-3:33:10 (testimony of Alec Hansen).
173. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 7-15-4203, -4206(16).
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who under the bill could keep a large area of blighted inner city
land out of reach from renewal. 174 Thus, in enacting S.B. 41 the
Legislature left cities with the burden of dealing with genuine
blight while taking away a significant tool for doing so.
S.B. 41 not only undermined the purpose of S.B. 363, it also
created perplexing contradictions with other unchanged aspects of
the Urban Renewal Law. In particular, the Law still contains
strong policy statements that a city "shall afford maximum opportunity" for "redevelopment of the urban renewal area by private
enterprise" including in the "disposition of any property acquired."'17 5 At the same time S.B. 41 changed the definition of"redevelopment" to state that "privateenterprise or public agencies
may not develop the condemned area in a way that is not for a
public use." 1 76 S.B. 41 then added a definition of "public use" that
includes every eminent domain category listed in Montana Code
Annotated § 70-30-102 (some of which involve private ownership)
as well as projects financed by tax increment financing under
Montana Code Annotated § 7-15-42881 77 -projects that include
not only urban renewal but industrial infrastructure development, technology infrastructure development, and aerospace
transportation. It is unclear how such an expansive definition of
public use would not embrace some forms of private ownership.
Every proponent who rose in favor of S.B. 41 cited Kelo as the
reason for its need. 178 Recordings of the legislative committee
hearings suggest that most legislators failed to appreciate that
they had responsibly delimited a city's ability to redevelop truly
unsafe and dilapidated properties under S.B. 363 but simultaneously eliminated that redevelopment tool under S.B. 41.179 The
recordings also suggest that most legislators did not appreciate
the conflicting objectives of the bills, although S.B. 363's sponsor

174. Mar. 7, 2007 H. Hrg., supra n. 169, at 1:35:01-1:40:52 (testimony of Chris Behan).
175. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 7-15-4208, -4271(3) (2005 and 2007).
176. Mont. Sen. 41, 60th Leg., 1 Reg. Sess. 3-4 (Nov. 21, 2006) (available at http://laws.
leg.mt.gov/pls/laws07/law0203w$.startup) (emphasis added).
177. Id. at 3.
178. Mont. Sen. Comm. on Judiciary, An Act to Narrow Uses for Eminent Domain Law:
Hearingon S.B. 41, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. 1:07-15:51 (Jan. 24, 2007) (audio file) (including
statements such as "We are taking the Supreme Court's invitation to be more stringent"
and "We can trump Kelo") [hereinafter Jan. 24, 2007 Sen. Hrg.]; Mar. 7, 2007 H. Hrg.,
supra n. 169, at 1:09:31-1:26:56.
179. Feb. 13, 2007 Sen. Hrg., supra n. 165, at 1:45:54-1:48:15; Mar. 23, 2007 H. Hrg.,
supra n. 164, at 3:06:02-3:07:02; Mar. 7, 2007 H. Hrg., supra n. 169, at 2:14:50-2:17:47.
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made clear that the bills presented alternative rather than companion proposals 1 8 0
E.

The New Urban Renewal Law and Some Possible Ways to
Restore Its Balance

Viewed collectively, Montana's post-Kelo legislative efforts reveal the degree to which public sentiment drove the State's eminent domain reforms. It made sense for Montana to revisit an urban renewal law that is now nearly fifty years old-to ensure both
that it does not allow government abuse and that it reflects the
needs of Montana's communities today. But in revisiting that law
Montanans lost sight of the very reasons why they felt the law
was important in the first place-to renew areas in communities
that legitimately need restoration for health and safety reasons.
Montana's rush to respond to Kelo left the State with a paradoxical urban renewal law that simultaneously favors blight redevelopment through private enterprise and takes away a key tool
for implementing that policy. One can imagine that the Blackfoot
Tribe of 1959, facing a fear of further disease outbreaks, valued
that additional tool. One can also imagine a future community
left with unsafe blight (like abandoned industrial land) because a
landowner refuses to sell and the city cannot afford to condemn
and permanently own the property. One can even imagine a resource-rich community that can afford condemnation and its ongoing maintenance, but now has no private options for using that
property in a way that renews the neighborhood and prevents the
recurrence of blight.' 8 '
Montana's rush to respond to Kelo also overlooked some balanced approaches already suggested by Montana's eminent domain jurisprudence. For example, the statutes could require a
city to show that there is a compelling interest for the redevelopment condemnation and that the condemnation is narrowly tailored.' 82 The statutes could also clarify and strengthen the re180. Mar. 7, 2007 H. Hrg., supra n. 169, at 2:15:40-2:16:15; Feb. 13, 2007 Sen. Hrg.,
supra n. 165, at 1:45:54-1:47:00; Mar. 23, 2007 H. Hrg., supra n. 164, at 3:06:02-3:07:02.
181. These hypothetical situations may seem like remote "worst case" scenarios, but it
was also the remote "worst case" scenario of Kelo that prompted S.B. 41 and S.B. 363.
Recall that outside of DeWolf, no one can cite an example of a Montana city using urban
renewal to take a neighborhood property, and even there the proposed condemnation was
neither targeted at a home nor intended for transfer to private enterprise. See supra pt.
II.C.2. and related discussion.
182. Supra pt. II.C.1.
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quirement that a city prove the impossibility of rehabilitation
before condemning a property for redevelopment.18 3 And the statutes could make explicit the requirement that a city separately
justify each condemned property, as opposed to the renewal area
as a whole.1 8 4 Even the ill-fated 1-154, despite its hidden ambitions, allowed condemnations of blighted land when the government met a heightened evidentiary burden (clear and convincing)
in the condemnation proceedings.18 5 All of these approaches leave
room for a city to condemn and redevelop in truly compelling situations of blight-a power envisioned by the still-existing policy
statements contained in the Urban Renewal Law.
CONCLUSION

Montana's response to Kelo was good to the extent that it
caused the Legislature to examine the State's eminent domain
laws and address areas of potential ambiguity. But in many ways
the legislative response aimed to appease the fear of the populace
rather than to genuinely examine and build on its rich eminent
domain law-a law that already contains meaningful landowner
protections. This fear caused the Legislature to overreact by eliminating rather than merely limiting a key urban renewal tool in
the prevention of unsafe community blight. Perhaps the year
before Montana's next legislative session will provide Montanans
with enough distance from Kelo to consider how to best restore the
balance between private property and community safety.

183. See supra n. 110 and related discussion.
184. Id.
185. Supra pt. III.A.
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